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As the editors claim in the introduction of this edited volume, recent literature 
has shed light on the ‘considerable agency exercised by corporations in certain 
global theaters’ and has noticed the need to ‘proscribe corporations a global 
role’.1 This chapter will primarily focus on the East India companies and espe-
cially on the Dutch East India company (voc). It will ask how these East India 
companies managed to organize its activities that spanned the globe and if the 
editors of this volume are right in presenting them as protagonists in global his-
tory. Although they are the clearest example of corporations with ‘a global role’, 
historians have until now not necessarily considered them part of Global Histo-
ry. The study of East India companies more often than not has a strong national 
bias that stands in the way of more abstract conceptualization of their essential 
form. National historians have a hard time jumping over their own shadow and 
acknowledging that even East India companies are part of similar institutional 
developments elsewhere. For example, in an attempt to accentuate the peculiar 
history and ‘national’ identity of their East India Company, comparisons and 
connections with the histories of other East India companies are often simply 
not made, while East India companies are in general not considered similar to 
other corporations of their times.
As this volume shows, a more general conception of corporations helps us 
understand that East India companies were not that different from other cor-
porations when we consider their constitutional form. The question that re-
mains, however, is if a general conception based solely on English cases is also 
applicable to foreign corporations. This chapter of the book will focus on such 
a non- English case study, namely on the voc. Does the ‘distinctive Global So-
ciology of the Corporation’ as brought forward in this edited volume also apply 
to the voc? In order to answer this question, this chapter will first delve into 
the position of East India Companies within the field of Global History and 
will then try to relate the distinctive Global Sociology of the Corporation to 
the Dutch East India Company. In the last part of this chapter it will be argued 
 1 William A. Pettigrew & David Veevers (eds.), The Corporation as a Protagonist in Global Histo-
ry,1550– 1750, 13.
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that, although a more general conceptualization of corporations is necessary, 
similar global constitutional frameworks often had different local outcomes. 
This argument will be based on a more general comparison of the monopolies 
of the Dutch and English East India companies.
 Global History and the Distinctive Global 
Sociology of the Corporation
The first question of this chapter is if it is possible to integrate East India com-
panies into the field of Global History. Until today, historians have mainly told 
the histories of East India companies from a national perspective. Historians 
have in general focused on one company, often simply ignoring the histories of 
other ones. When comparisons were made between different national compa-
nies, historians wanted to understand which one was most successful or which 
country had the first ‘multinational company’ or which one served as ‘the early 
modern inspiration for modern joint stock corporations’.2 As the editors of this 
volume mention in the introduction, it is the task of Global historians (or of 
New Global History as they called it in the introduction) to ‘confront and adapt 
the traditional narratives [local, regional or national histories of other fields], 
especially those of a national perspective’.3
In theory at least, the history of East India companies, even more so 
than histories of other corporations, seems to tick all the boxes of the three 
‘methodogies of analysis’ of Global History: ‘comparativeness, connectedness 
and globalisation’.4 However, most global historians seem hesitant to include 
the study of East India companies as a topic of Global History. This is mainly 
due to the manner in which studies on this topic are often considered part 
of ‘Western- centric analysis’.5 Due to the archival material of the companies, 
 2 For the debate on rivalry between East India companies see: Holden Furber, Rival Empires 
of Trade in the Orient, 1600– 1800 (Minneapolis: ump, 1976). For the debate on the first mod-
ern company see: Pettigrew and Veevers (eds.), The Corporation as a Protagonist, 12– 13; Nick 
Robins, The corporation that Changed the World:  How the East India Company Shaped the 
Modern Mulitnational (London: Pluto Press, second Ed., 2012) or for similar Dutch versions 
of such stories: Henk den Heijer, De VOC en de beurs: de Verenigde Oost- Indische Compagnie 
als grondlegger van de eerste aandelenbeurs = The VOC and the exchange: how the VOC laid 
the foundations for the world’s first stock exchange (Amsterdam: Stichting Vereniging voor de 
Effectenhandel, 2002) and Heijer H.J. den, De geoctrooieerde compagnie. De VOC en de WIC als 
voorlopers van de naamloze vennootschap (Deventer: Kluwer, 2002).
 3 Pettigrew and Veevers (eds.), The Corporation as a Protagonist, 10
 4 Ibidem, 2.
 5 Ibidem, 9.
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it is difficult to write more than Asian history through European eyes. In re-
cent years, however, the study of the voc has clearly tried to move beyond this 
point.6
There is also a constant inherent danger in presenting the corporation (and 
their constitutions) as having its origins in Europe and being projected from 
Europe on Asia. Such projections of European institutions on Asia are Euro-
centric and problematic. For example, Wallerstein’s theory of how capitalism 
found its origins in Europe and was projected outwards in the era of European 
expansion has been strongly refuted.7 The question is then if defining a ‘Global 
Sociology of the Corporation’ helps historians to avoid these traps. Maybe even 
better, how such a theory be defined without falling into these traps that have 
already made so many victims.
Although the Dutch East India company has mainly been studied from a na-
tional perspectives and methodologies, its story has also been situated ‘within 
a wider, interconnected geographical context’.8 To a large extent, the ‘process-
es of negotiation with external constituencies: foreign merchants, interlopers, 
European rivals, and foreign states’ have been well studied in the Dutch case, 
albeit predominantly from the company’s perspective.9 The voc had trading 
posts flung out over Asia both to suit its European trade and its quite exten-
sive network of trade within Asia. As historians have rightfully concluded: we 
should not overestimate the European trade compared to the trade conducted 
by Asian traders. Neither were Europeans always the party imposing their will 
on trade and other traders. In actual fact, as argued by the ‘Global Sociology 
of the Corporation’, this far- flung network of trade meant that the voc took 
many different shapes and forms to suit its trading interests. This is also where 
I personally find the sociology most suitable for the analysis of East India com-
panies as it leaves room for these more hidden stories of commercial, cultural 
and political interaction.
The goal of this edited volume is to ‘uncover a transoceanic corporate so-
ciology which integrated a common global framework in the years 1550– 1750’.10 
Again, the most inspiring proposition of the theory is the idea that corporations 
 6 Especially see the publications in the tanap- monographs on the History of Asian- 
European Interaction of Brill.
 7 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World- System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins 
of the European World- Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
 8 Pettigrew and Veevers (eds.), The Corporation as a Protagonist, 8.
 9 Els Jacobs, Merchant in Asia: The Trade of the Dutch East India Company During the Eigh-
teenth Century (Leiden: cnws Publications, 2010).
 10 Pettigrew and Veevers (eds.), The Corporation as a Protagonist, 3.
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were intermediaries between the East and West. East India companies helped 
avoid a confrontation at the level of the state and helped avoid that institu-
tional traditions would collide in order for trade to thrive. They allowed for 
a smoother transition to Asian contexts as they could ignore questions both 
institutional differences and of sovereignty. The history of the voc illustrates 
this point even stronger than the history of the eic as the voc constantly tried 
to play the right cords in relation to Asian states. It should not be forgotten that 
in order for this game to work, Asian also needed to play along at some level. 
This also raises the question if the constitutional form of European companies 
was unique and special or if it mattered as much as claimed in this book.
The voc went to great lengths to submit and adapt itself to Asian rulers in 
order to safeguard trade. The most famous example of such behaviour was the 
fact that it fully submitted to Asian sovereignty of Tokugawa Japan.11 Its submis-
sion to Japanese sovereignty saved it from expulsion from Japan, which meant it 
was the only western power still allowed access to the island after 1639. The ac-
knowledgment of Japanese power was symbolized by the yearly voc- embassy 
with precious gifts to the court in Edo.12 The case of the King of Kandy on the 
island of Ceylon (present day Sri Lanka) proofs that the voc was opportunistic 
in measuring if it should apply its military weight or pursue a more submissive 
course of action. Although the voc was militarily stronger and held the King of 
Kandy in a commercial maritime stranglehold, for its trading interest it accept-
ed to acknowledge him as sovereign through a yearly embassy accompanied 
by lavish gifts. The instruction of the High Government in Batavia to the yearly 
embassy to the King of Kandy in order to obtain permission to cut cinnamon 
bark on his land says it all: ‘You have learned by experience that you will find 
the court [of Kandy] no better disposed than by flattering its grandeur and ex-
cellence, because without this, however distasteful in itself, we think it is almost 
impossible to obtain a satisfactory consummation of affaires, and since this is 
not expensive, it can be acquiesced in on all occasions’.13 Such behaviour un-
derlines the conclusion that corporations helped to deal with the sensibilities 
of sovereignty and trade in Asia.
 11 For the most recent publication on this remarkable episode: Adam Clulow, The Company 
and the Shogun: The Dutch Encounter with Tokugawa Japan (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 2014).
 12 Cynthia Viallé, ‘ “To Capture their Favour”:  on Gift- giving by the VOC’, in:  T. DaCosta 
Kauffman and M. North (eds.), Mediating Nederlandish Art and Material Culture in Asia 
(Amsterdam: aup, 2014), 291– 319.
 13 Chris Nierstrasz, In the Shadow of the Company. The Dutch East India Company and its 
Servants in the Period of its Decline, 1740– 1796 (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 51.
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The voc constantly calculated the least costly solution in their search for 
profits by either searching for military conflict or subordinating itself to for-
eign states.14 As a consequence, the voc has been typified as ‘a company of 
commerce but also of state’, which aimed at ‘internalizing protection costs’.15 
In practice, this meant that the voc waged continual war between 1602 and 
1684 without letting costs run out of hand. This policy initially came at a cost 
for those who had invested with the voc as it only started paying dividend 
to its shareholders after 1622.16 In conclusion, in the case of the voc, war and 
imposition of power on Asians and other European powers were very much 
part of its repertoire even before 1750, while in the ‘Transoceanic Corporate 
Sociology’ based on English corporation subordination avoidance of conflict 
is stressed as only after the period under studied in this edited volume English 
military power started imposing itself on Asia.
The voc also was quite independent in its choices of policy, which ‘allowed 
corporations to be jurisdictionally evasive’.17 The example mentioned in the 
introduction of the ‘Royal African Company and its alliance with the French 
Senegal Company in Africa at a time when the English and French states were 
at war in Europe’, was replicated in Asia too in the period leading up to the War 
of Austrian Succession (1740– 1748). The French and English eic had simply 
agreed not to wage war on each other during the War of Spanish Succession 
(1702– 1715), and when tensions rose again afterwards decided to do so again in 
the event of war in Europe. After war broke out in 1740, the English and French 
crowns started sending their own fleets and armies to Asia in order to break 
the deadlock. With intrusion of state sponsored military support, it became 
impossible for European eics to stay out of European conflicts. The voc, who 
managed to keep state inference out, it only received minor military support 
from its home- state after 1780, still played according to the old rules. It was able 
to stick to a policy of neutrality during the War of Austrian Succession, despite 
the fact that its home state was involved in this war.18
 14 Gerrit Knaap (ed.), De Verenigde Oost- Indische Compagnie:  Tussen oorlog en diplomatie 
[The United East India Company between War and Diplomacy] (Leiden: kitlv, 2002).
 15 Femme Gaastra,The Dutch East India Company. Expansion and Decline (Zutphen:  Wal-
burg Pers, 2003), 56; Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth 
Century. The East India Companies and the Decline of the Caravan Trade (Chicago: upc, 
1974) and Niels Steensgaard, Carracks, Caravans and Companies (Copenhagen: Studentlit-
teratur, 1973).
 16 Gaastra, Dutch East India Company, 37 and 23– 27.
 17 Pettigrew and Veevers, The Corporation as a Protagonist, 25.
 18 Nierstrasz, In the Shadow of the Company, 31– 34.
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Surely, East India Companies were quite ‘autonomous in Asia from the over-
sight of their domicile state’ in far- away Europe, but could also easily loose this 
autonomy without a change to the official constitutional privileges it held. The 
freedom and flexibiliy of the eic to decide on policy dwindled when the home 
state side- stepped the company and directly imposed its own military power 
in Asia. When the eic started receiving military assistance from its home state, 
who started sending out naval forces and troops to help out against the French, 
this meant that although the military power of the eic was thus enhanced, it 
lost its capacity to decide on the level of military conflict in Asia. In the pro-
cess, it also lost its ability to subordinate itself to Asian states, while the voc 
was still able to continue a more hybrid policy.19
 Monopoly
In contrast to conventional wisdom, the editors of this study claim that the 
East India companies ‘in their global operations […] were not monopolies’. 
This somewhat cryptic message contains a high level of truth, but also leads to 
the question: if East India companies were not monopolies what where they 
then? What does such an imperfect form of monopoly mean for a story that 
puts the constitutional form of corporations at its center?
Although different East India companies all shared similar constitution-
al privileges, in fact the outcome of these monopolies took different shapes 
and forms. A comparison between the monopolies of the Dutch and English 
East India companies will even provide proof that the ‘sociology of the Global 
Corporation’ makes sense, but that local outcomes of monopolies were more 
elusive than a general theory makes us believe. Even stronger, East India com-
panies were quite pragmatic in applying their constitutional privileges. Other 
East India companies fit less into the sociology of the Global Corporation than 
the eic, but even when they do fit, their particular context could lead to dra-
matically opposed outcomes. What happens to the story when we compare the 
constitutional form of East India companies and the institutional context in 
which they functioned? What consequences did differences in the institution-
al context have on the interaction between the Dutch and English East India 
companies?20
 19 Ibidem, 14– 17.
 20 This part is mainly based on: Chris Nierstrasz, Rivalry for Trade in Tea and Textiles. The En-
glish and Dutch East India Companies (1700– 1800) (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 
especially on  chapter 1.
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East India companies were subordinate to state authority home and abroad. 
As we have seen, they were subordinate to the home state, but through their 
constitutional privileges in their home state, they were even capable of under-
mining state authority in other European countries. This was especially true 
for the fiscal arrangements on trade that states had set for themselves. For ex-
ample, the trade of eic was mainly aimed at its home- market, consisting of 
Great Britain and its Atlantic colonies. After the Navigation Acts after 1651, the 
market for Asian goods in this area was theoretically sealed off from Europe-
an competitors. Both the state and the eic profited from this constellation as 
the eic had an assured market for its import against monopoly prices, while 
the English states taxed the import of Asian goods accordingly. In contrast, 
the voc had a very limited home- market and competed on the internation-
al market. This meant taxation on import and re- export of Asian goods was 
low in order to meet competition head- on. At the same time, the voc had the 
monopoly on direct import of Asian goods from Asia, but the import of Asian 
goods from other European countries was allowed. The direct consequence of 
these differences was that the especially tea (not only from the voc, but also 
from the other continental companies) was smuggled into England and sold 
at a much lower price than the tea from the eic. In turn, this meant that the 
imports of continental East India companies indirectly undermined the con-
stitutional privilege of the eic and taxation by the English state.
The different constellations under which the monopolies of both compa-
nies operated in their home- countries become clear when we look at the ex-
ports of silver. A strange paradox existed in the attitudes towards trade with 
Asia as mercantilist theory prescribed silver should not leave the country, but 
trade with Asia was mainly conducted through export of this precious metal. 
While discussion existed on this issue in England, in the Dutch Republic the 
exports of silver by the voc was never challenged or even put up for discus-
sion. This difference was mainly due to the fact that the eic imported goods 
for its own market (so in fact silver was really being exported), while the voc 
exported most of the goods from Asia to other European countries with a profit 
(leading to the influx of silver to the Dutch Republic despite exports of silver 
to Asia). As such, trade with Asia was a drain (at least until empire in India 
was established) on English silver, while it was not in the case of the Dutch 
Republic. The lack of discussion on the issue in the Dutch Republic was not 
born out an unawareness of economic reality or an inability of understanding 
economic theory (as often implicitly argued by English scholars), but rather 
due to a different institutional set- up which made exports of silver acceptable.
The different context of trade also meant that competition between compa-
nies played out beyond what constitutional rules make us believe. Monopoly 
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was more often than not an illusion and could even be suspended for com-
petitive reasons. This is true in the intra- Asian trade where servants of East 
India companies were allowed to conduct private trade as long as they did not 
interfere with trade that their employer considered part of its monopoly. Log-
ically, the voc had a wider range of goods it considered its monopoly than 
the eic. On the ships of the companies to Europe, the situation was not much 
different: servants had private trade privileges, which they were allowed to use 
for private trade in certain items. For instance, the voc allowed it servants the 
right to conduct substantial private trade to Europe in tea and Indian textiles, 
in order to hamper the trade of other East India companies. In turn, the eic 
allowed it servants private trade to Europe in almost everything but Indian 
textiles, tea and pepper in order to hamper the trade of the voc. In short, al-
though East India companies have often depicted as strong monopolies, rules 
were in fact imposed pragmatically.
 Conclusion
So to conclude, corporations, and especially East India companies, have the 
potential for being studied as protagonists in global history. Doing so from the 
perspective from English corporations is methodologically sound, but a compar-
ison with corporations from outside England is potentially even more promising. 
Otherwise, there is a danger that the theory will fit for English corporations, but 
not for other corporations in Europe or beyond Europe. In many ways the theory 
proposed in this edited volume also fits well with the Dutch East India company. 
It was very similar to English corporations in its institutional form, but also fol-
lowed its own trajectory. At the same time, we have seen how these companies 
were very much early- modern entities which meant they were very imperfect. 
This means that human capital and the way it organized itself, was just as im-
portant as its institutional form. As the activities of these corporations spanned 
the globe, they had to be very flexible and adapt to local situations. The strong 
point of the theory proposed in this book is that it acknowledges this flexibility, 
despite the apparent rigidity of constitutional forms. This flexibility helped con-
duct business as usual even when business reached unchartered waters.
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